Abstract-We consider an echo-assisted communication model wherein block-coded messages transmitted by a source reach the destination as multiple noisy copies. We address adversarial attacks on such models wherein a subset of the received copies at the destination are rendered unreliable by an adversary. Particularly, we study a non-persistent attack model with the adversary attacking 50% of the codewords at random. We show that this attack drives the destination to detect the attacked copies within every codeword before combining them to recover the information bits. Our main objective is to compute the achievable rates of practical attack-detection strategies as a function of their false-positive and miss-detection rates. However, due to intractability in obtaining closed-form expressions on mutual information, we present a new framework to approximate the achievable rates in terms of their false-positives under special conditions. We show that the approximate rates offered by our framework is lower bounded by that of conservative countermeasures, thereby giving rise to interesting questions on code-design criteria at the source. Finally, we showcase the approximate rates achieved by traditional as well as neural-network based attackdetection strategies, and study their applicability to detect attacks on block-coded messages of short block-lengths.
I. INTRODUCTION
A number of wireless applications exists involving echoassisted communication wherein messages transmitted by the source arrive at the destination as multiple noisy copies. Typical examples include communication over frequencyselective channels [1] , relay networks [2] , and multiple receive antennas [3] . In such echo-assisted scenarios, it is well known that suitably combining the noisy received copies at the destination increases the effective signal-to-noise-ratio, thereby facilitating higher transmission rate.
In this work, we consider attack models on echo-assisted communication wherein a subset of the copies collected at the destination might have been manipulated by an adversary. Such scenarios are attributed to practical limitations on the adversary to manipulate all the copies. For instance, in the case of frequency-selective channels with delay spreads, the adversary may have processing-delay constraints to manipulate the symbols on the first copy, but not the subsequent ones [1] . We study a specific adversarial attack referred to as the flipping attack [4] wherein the message bits of the attacked copy are flipped at 50% rate independently. With such attacks, the dilemma at the destination is whether to combine the multiple copies or to discard them when recovering the messages. To gain insights on the attack model, we focus on the case of two received copies, out of which the second copy might have been manipulated by an adversary. Although adversarial models on binary channels have been studied in the literature [4] , [5] , flipping attacks on echo-assisted communication involving binary input and continuous output have not been studied hitherto. Henceforth, throughout the paper, we refer to the source and the destination as Alice and Bob, respectively. Plot of {(p md|x , 1 − p f a|x )} of two detectors, where p md|x and p f a|x denote the miss-detection and false-positive rates conditioned on input codewords x n =x for n = 3. We propose a framework to approximate the achievable rates of detectors which have {(p md|x , 1 − p f a|x ) |x ∈ {−1, 1} n } below the line with slope µ 1−µ for some small 0 < µ < 1. To exemplify, given a small µ > 0, our framework can approximate the rate of the detector marked with symbol × in green but not the one with • in red.
A. Motivation and Contributions
Consider an echo-assisted communication, wherein information bits from Alice to Bob are transmitted as a sequence of n-length binary codewords. Specifically, each codeword, represented by x n ∈ {−1, +1} n , is received at Bob as two noisy copies, given by y n 1 = γ 1 x n + z n 1 ∈ R n and y n 2 = γ 2 x n +z n 2 ∈ R n , where γ 1 and γ 2 are constants perfectly known to Bob, and z n 1 and z n 2 are statistically independent additive noise components. The adversarial model in our setting is that the second copy y n 2 is vulnerable to the flipping attack but not the first one. As a result, Bob needs to detect whether the second copy is attacked, and then decide on combining the two copies. In this work, we consider a non-persistent attack model, wherein y n 2 is vulnerable to the flipping attack on 50% of the codewords chosen at random in an i.i.d. fashion.
A conservative strategy to handle this adversarial setting is as follows:
• Bob discards y n 2 of every codeword irrespective of the attack, and uses only y n 1 to recover the information bits.
• Alice designs an n-length codebook C ⊂ {−1, +1} n (designed for Gaussian channels) which achieves the rate 1 n I(x n ; y n 1 ). Keeping in view of the above conservative baseline, we are interested in designing a detection strategy at Bob that can assist Alice in transmitting at higher rate than 1 n I(x n ; y n 1 ). Towards that end, Bob needs to detect the attack within the first n ′ < n samples (referred to as the frame length) of every codeword, and then decide whether the second copy y n 2 can be used to recover the information bits. Subsequently, the decision on the combining strategy has to be fed back to Alice so that any possible rate modifications can be incorporated through the next n − n ′ coded symbols. Given that a practical detection strategy is typically imperfect, we are interested in quantifying the achievable rates of a detection strategy by incorporating its associated miss-detection and false-positive rates. However, since the attack model is not memoryless and the input alphabet is finite in size [6] , we show that computing the achievable rates for arbitrary miss-detection rates is challenging for large n. To circumvent this issue, we provide a new framework, as depicted in Fig. 1 , to approximate the achievable rates of detectors under special conditions on missdetection and false-positive rates (see Theorem 1) . We also show that the achievable rates offered by our framework is lower bounded by that of the conservative strategy, thereby giving rise to interesting questions on code-design criteria at Alice. We propose a code-design criteria to assist Alice in achieving the rates promised by the detector, and show that the criteria is closely coupled with n ′ , which is the number of samples after which Bob has to feedback his decision on attack detection. Finally, we showcase the results of attackdetection strategies which are motivated by both traditional as well as neural network ideas, and study their applicability to detect attacks on codewords of short block-lengths.
Notations: For an n-dimensional random vector y n ∈ R n with joint probability distribution function P (y n ), its differential entropy, denoted by h(y n ), is represented as −E[log 2 (P (y n ))], where the expectation is over P (y n ). A Gaussian random variable with zero mean and variance σ 2 is denoted by N(0, σ 2 ). An n × n identity matrix, an n-length vector of zeros, and an n-length vector of ones are denoted by I n , 0 n , and 1 n , respectively. For a given n-length vector, denoted by y n , the notation y n ′ for n ′ ≤ n, denotes the n ′ -length vector containing the first n ′ components of y n . The notation prob(·) denotes the usual probability operator.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Alice transmits an n-length sequence x n ∈ {−1, +1} n such that the components of x n are i.i.d. over the Probability Mass Function (PMF) {α, 1 − α} for some 0 < α < 1. Meanwhile, Bob receives two copies of x n over the Additive White Gaussian Noise (AWGN) channels as
where γ 1 ∈ R and γ 2 ∈ R are constants known to Bob, z n 1 and z n 2 represent the additive Gaussian noise distributed as N(0 n , σ 2 I n ). We assume that z n 1 and z n 2 are statistically independent. Between the two copies, we assume that y n 2 is vulnerable to the flipping attack, whereas y n 1 is not. To model the flipping attack on y n 2 , we introduce Hadamard product, denoted by •, between b n ∈ {−1, +1} n and x n . With attack, the components of b n are i.i.d. over the PMF {0.5, 0.5}, and are unknown to Bob. However, without attack, b n = 1 n . In this adversarial setting, the attacker executes the flipping attack on a codeword chosen randomly with probability 0.5 in an i.i.d. fashion. By using A = 0 and A = 1 to denote the events of attack and no-attack, respectively, we have prob(A = 0) = prob(A = 1) = 0.5.
We compute the mutual information (MI) offered by the channel when A is perfectly known to Bob, namely,
. We refer to this case as the Genie detector. When A = 1, each bit of x n is flipped by the attacker with probability 0.5 in an i.i.d. fashion, and as a result, it is straightforward to prove that I(x n ; y n 2 | A = 1) = 0. As a countermeasure, the following proposition shows that discarding y n 2 when A = 1 is the optimal strategy at Bob (we omit the proof due to lack of space).
Proposition 1: When the components of
, and I(y (1). Without the flipping attack, i.e., A = 0, the mutual information of the channel is given by
Thus, with perfect knowledge of A at Bob, the MI offered by the channel is
where y n c,na in the last equality is obtained by combining y 
, which implies that the combining strategy is optimal without the attack. Furthermore, M Genie can be simplified as
by using the memoryless nature of the channel, attributed to the perfect knowledge of A at Bob. Here, y c,na = (
2 )x + z c and y 1 = γ 1 x + z 1 are the scalar channels such that the additive noise z c = γ 1 z 1 + γ 2 z 2 is distributed as N(0, σ 2 eq ). Since x takes values from finite input alphabet, M Genie in (3) can be numerically computed as a function of
the input PMF {α, 1 − α}, constants γ 1 and γ 2 , and σ 2 [6] . Specifically, I(x; y c,na ) is given by
where h(y c,na ) = −E[log 2 (P (y c,na ))] such that P (y c,na ) is as given in (2). The conditional entropy h(y c,na |x) can be computed using the distribution P (y c,na |x = β) given by
, for β ∈ {−1, +1}. Similarly, we can also compute I(x; y 1 ).
In the next section, we study the MI of the combining strategy when the attack detector at Bob is not perfect.
III. ACHIEVABLE RATES WITH PRACTICAL DETECTION STRATEGY
We consider a practical attack-detection strategy, which uses the received samples {y In the event of miss-detection, i.e., when A = 1 andÂ = 0, we know that b n ∈ {−1, +1} n is random and unknown to Bob. Therefore, y n c is denoted as y n c,a , and is given by y n c,a = (
However, when A = 0 andÂ = 0, we have b n = 1 n , and therefore, y n c is denoted as y n c,na , and is given by y n c,na = (
The MI of this detection strategy, denoted by M
where prob(Â = 0) =
, we have to compute I(x n ; y n c |Â = 0) for a given block-length n. However, this needs us to evaluate the differential entropy of the probability distribution function P (y n c |Â = 0) given in (9) . Since the input alphabet is finite in size, the corresponding differential entropy can only be computed using numerical methods, and as a result, computing M non−Genie p md ,p f a is intractable for sufficiently large n (of the order of hundreds). In a nutshell, the above computational issue is because the equivalent channel whenÂ = 0 is not memoryless. To circumvent this problem, we show that the MI value M non−Genie p md ,p f a of some detectors can be computed using an approximation under special conditions on p md and p f a .
The following sequence of definitions and lemmas are useful to present our results on approximation in Theorem 1.
Definition 1: For 0 ≤ x, y ≤ 1, let a set R µ , for some negligible µ > 0, be defined as
Definition 2: For a given attack detector, we define its performance profile as
where p md|x = prob(Â = 0|A = 1, x n =x) and p f a|x = prob(Â = 1|A = 0, x n =x).
where y n ∈ R n and || · || Since the accuracy of the approximation depends on µ, we henceforth denote ≈ by ≈ µ .
Lemma 2: If γ 1 , γ 2 and σ 2 eq are such that d 2 max (Sx) ≤ 2log e (2)σ 2 eq for eachx ∈ {−1, +1} n , then we have
for every y n ∈ R n . Proof: We only show the applicability of (10). Since P (y n c,a = y n ) can be written as a weighted sum of P (y n c,a = y n |x) over allx, (10) can be used to show the applicability
of (11). Given x n =x, the n-dimensional distribution of y n c,a is given by
When evaluated at y n ∈ R n , we can upper bound the above term as
where d 2 min (y n , Sx) is as given in Definition 3. Meanwhile, the n-dimensional distribution of y n c,na is given by
where the first inequality holds since (|γ 1 | 2 + |γ 2 | 2 )x ∈ Sx. The second inequality holds because of triangle inequality. Finally, if d 2 max (Sx) ≤ 2log e (2)σ 2 eq for eachx ∈ {−1, +1} n , then (13) can be further lower bounded as
where the last inequality is due to the bound in (12). This implies that P (y n c,a = y n |x) ≤ 2P (y n c,na = y n |x) for each y n . This completes the proof.
Using the results of Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, we are now ready to present our result on approximation.
Theorem 1: If γ 1 , γ 2 and σ 2 eq are such that d 2 max (Sx) ≤ 2log e (2)σ 2 eq for eachx ∈ {−1, +1} n , and if the detection strategy is such that P ⊆ R µ , for a fixed small µ > 0, then we have M non−Genie p md ,p f a
, where
and the notation ≈ µ,pdf captures the notion that the approximation on MI is a result of approximating the underlying distributions using ≈ µ . Proof: Based on the expression of M non−Genie p md ,p f a in (7), it is straightforward to show that I(x n ; y n 1 ) = nI(x; y 1 ). In this proof, we only address the computation of I(x n ; y 
where h(y c,na ) = −E[log 2 (P (y c,na ))] such that P (y c,na ) is given by (2) . Similarly, the conditional differential entropy h(y
where p(x|Â = 0) prob(x n =x|Â = 0) and h(y n c |Â = 0, x n =x) = −E[log 2 (P (y n c |Â = 0, x n =x))] such that P (y n c |Â = 0, x n =x) can be written as
To arrive at (19), we assume that A and x n are statistically independent. Again, applying the results of Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 on (19), we have the approximation
for every x n =x. As a result, we have h(y n c |Â = 0, x n = x) ≈ µ,pdf h(y n c,na | x n =x). Finally, using the above expression in (18), we get
where the last equality is due to i.i.d. nature of z n c . Overall, using (20) and (17) in (7), we get the expression in (16).
Due to intractability in evaluating M non−Genie p md ,p f a , Theorem 1 approximates the achievable rates of a special class of detection strategies that operate in the region P ⊆ R µ on the channel parameters γ 1 , γ 2 , σ 2 satisfying Lemma 2. For such a class of detectors, the achievable rate M approx p f a , given in (16) is now easy to evaluate since I(x; y c,na ) and I(x; y 1 ) can be computed using standard numerical methods [6] . Note that the Genie detector trivially belongs to this special class since p f a ≥ 0, and as a result, (16) is upper bounded by M Genie in (3). Also note that (16) is lower bounded by nI(x; y 1 ), which is the achievable rate offered by the conservative strategy of unconditionally dropping y n 2 when recovering the information bits.
A. Code-Design Criterion and Transmission Strategy
In this section, we propose a code-design criterion to achieve the rate M approx p f a offered by a practical detection strategy. Before describing the transmission strategy, we seek the following ingredients for a given block-length n:
Ingredients: A code pair (C 1 , C 2 ) where C j ⊂ {−1, 1} n for j = 1, 2 satisfying the following criteria
• The size of C 1 is 2 ⌊nR1⌋ where R 1 = I(x; y 1 ) − ǫ, for some small ǫ > 0, such that p e (C 1 ) < δ for some δ > 0, where p e (C 1 ) is the average probability of error at Bob when decoding C 1 using an appropriate decoder.
• The size of C 2 is 2 ⌊nR2⌋ where R 2 = I(x; y c,na ) − ǫ, for some small ǫ > 0, such that p e (C 2 ) < δ for some δ > 0, where p e (C 2 ) is the average probability of error at Bob when decoding C 2 using an appropriate decoder.
• C 1 ⊆ C 2 .
• For every codeword c 1 ∈ C 1 , there exists exactly 2 ⌊nR2⌋−⌊nR1⌋ codewords in C 2 , denoted by the set C 2 (c 1 ), such that for each c 2 ∈ C 2 (c 1 ), we have c 2,i = c 1,i for 1 ≤ i ≤ n ′ where n ′ < n is fixed. Here, c 2,i and c 1,i denote the i-th components of the codewords c 2 and c 1 , respectively.
Transmission Strategy: Before transmission, Alice does not know whether y n 2 is attacked. As a result, Alice transmits the components of a chosen codeword in two blocks: (i) first block constitutes the first n ′ < n symbols of x n , and the second block constitutes the rest of the n − n ′ symbols of x n . The parameter n ′ is chosen based on the attack-detection strategy, which needs at least n ′ samples of y n 1 , y n 2 to detect the attack.
• Based on ⌊nR 1 ⌋ information bits, Alice picks a codeword c 1 ∈ C 1 and transmits the first n ′ components of it to Bob. of attack detectors based on KNN and NN classifier for various n ′ ∈ {10, 20, . . . , 100} and SNR = {0, 5, 10, 15} in dB. We omit the results for SNR = 10, 15 since both strategies achieve the Genie bound.
• Bob feeds back one bit of information on whether y n 2 is attacked after observing y n ′ 1 and y n ′ 2 .
• If y n 2 is attacked, then Alice continues to transmit the rest of the n − n ′ components of c 1 . On the other hand, if y n 2 is not attacked then additional ⌊nR 2 ⌋ − ⌊nR 1 ⌋ bits are encoded by using a codeword c 2 ∈ C 2 (c 1 ) and then the rest of the n − n ′ components of c 2 are transmitted.
Note that the code-design criteria is closely coupled with the value n ′ chosen by Bob. If we were to work with arbitrary p md > 0, then we would need to design C 2 to achieve the rate I(x n ; y n c |Â = 0). Along that direction, we notice that designing codebooks on the signal model y n c,a = (|γ 1 | 2 +b n |γ 2 | 2 )•x n +z n c is challenging. Our approach of operating the detection strategy in the region P ⊆ R µ circumvents this problem as codebooks for Gaussian channels with finite alphabets are well studied in the literature.
IV. EXPERIMENT RESULTS
To conduct experiments on attack-detection in echo-assisted communication, we use the system model in Section II with α = 0.5, γ 1 = γ 2 = 1, and SNR = 1 σ 2 ∈ {0, 5, 10, 15} in dB. We employ the following two detection strategies
• k Nearest-Neighbor (KNN) MI Estimation • Neural Network (NN) Classifier which are designed to detect the flipping attack by using the first n ′ samples of the received copies, namely {y
For each combination of n ′ ∈ {10, 20, . . . , 100} and SNR ∈ {0, 5, 10, 15}, we conduct the experiments to compute p f a of the above detectors by driving their p md = 0.1%. Subsequently, we plug the corresponding p f a in (16) to obtain M approx p f a , as presented in Fig. 2 . For more details on our experiments, we refer the reader to [10] , where the source codes of the detection strategies are also available.
A. k Nearest-Neighbor (KNN) MI Estimation
In this method, we estimate I(y 1 ; y 2 ) using scikit-learn [7] library's MI calculation method based on non-parametric methods of entropy estimation using k-nearest neighbors [8] . Given that the reference values I(y 1 ; y 2 | A = 0) and I(y 1 ; y 2 | A = 1) can be computed off-line, the proposed detection strategy decides on the attack depending on whether the estimate is above or below the chosen threshold. Here, the threshold is empirically chosen such that the miss-detection rate is bounded by 0.1%. For experiments, we use the parameter k = 3 and 4, and then measure the false-positive rates of the strategy against a large ensemble of codewords.
The corresponding values of M approx p f a are presented in Fig.  2 , which shows that while KNN is suboptimal for smaller values of n ′ at SNR = 0 dB, it approaches the Genie for n ′ as small as 40 at SNR = 5 dB. The plot also shows that k = 4 outperforms k = 3. For larger values of k, it is well known that the estimation error (with reference to the true MI) increases [7] , and therefore, we do not increase k to detect the attacks.
B. Neural Network (NN) Classifier
Neural networks are widely known to provide state-of-theart classification performance on image, audio and several data sets. Inspired by such NNs, we pose attack detection as a supervised classification problem thereby assisting the detection strategy to achieve rates close to M Genie . The proposed NN uses two hidden layers with ReLU activation function followed by a sigmoid output at the end. The inputs to the training phase constitutes N = 200000 frames of channel outputs, namely, {y
} (with 50% of the frames under attack) along with the respective ground truths on attack. Based on the inputs, the NN estimates the probability of attack by minimizing an appropriate binary cross-entropy function. We train for eight epochs to ensure convergence over the training set with a batch size of 512 using the Adam optimizer [9] . To achieve the constraint of p md = 0.1%, we do not use 0.5 as the threshold (which is standard for sigmoid activation) for classification. Instead, we empirically find an appropriate threshold which gives 0.1% miss-detection rate on the training data set, and then measure the false-positive rates p f a on the validation data set consisting 100000 frames with 50% of them under attack. The associated values of M approx p f a are presented in Fig. 2 , which show that the NN classifier outperforms the KNN detection significantly at SNR = 0 dB.
C. Detection Performance with Skewed Distribution
Instead of using α = 0.5, we introduce a non-uniform PMF {α, 1 − α} on x, and then train the NN with corresponding channel outputs {y 
V. DISCUSSION
For each n ′ and SNR, we can evaluate the tightness of the approximate rates in Fig. 2 by first computing P, and then determining an appropriate µ ′ such that P ⊆ R µ ′ . With that, (16) qualifies as the approximate rate with accuracy µ ′ . Although obtaining the performance profile P through exhaustive experiments is computationally challenging for large n, sampling techniques can be used to estimate µ ′ . For instance, at n ′ = 50 and SNR = 0 dB, we have empirically computed the pairs {(p md|x , 1 − p f a|x )} for 10000 randomly chosen codewords, and have verified that more than 99% of them lie inside R µ ′ with µ ′ = 3 × 10 −3 . As the second caveat we recollect that Theorem 1 is applicable if γ 1 , γ 2 and σ 2 satisfy the conditions in Lemma 2. However, for arbitrary values of γ 1 , γ 2 and σ 2 , we do not have a proof on the applicability of the upper bound in (10) for all y n ∈ R n , nor we can verify (10) for a given y n ∈ R n due to intractable distributions. By acknowledging these limitations we caution the reader not to interpret the plots in Fig. 2 as exact achievable rates. Nevertheless, we have presented M approx p f a as they serve as benchmarks for comparison when tighter approximations are derived on M non−Genie p md ,p f a in future. For future work, we are interested in the following directions:
• We are interested in explicit code constructions of C 1 and C 2 along with a practical bit-mapping algorithm so that the rates promised by M approx p f a can be achieved.
• We also intend to extend the proposed framework to study the achievable rates when Alice uses higher-order constellations, and/or when Bob receives more than two copies of the codewords.
• In the proposed framework, we have proved that M approx p f a can be used as an approximation to M non−Genie p md ,p f a under special conditions on P, γ 1 , γ 2 and σ 2 . We are interested in new approximations or bounds on M non−Genie p md ,p f a which are applicable for arbitrary values of p md and p f a .
